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The Souza and Helfend decisions could represent a major
turning point for the future of the collateral source -rule in
California. Although there have been no indications that the
holdings will be so extended, they could be extended to apply to
individuals as well as governmental entites, so that the rule would
virtually cease to exist. The question turns on the policy
considerations of where the burden of compensation should lie,
and the desirability of sanctioning double recovery by certain
plaintiffs as against allowing the defendant to avoid full liability.
The middle course, while perhaps not a total solution, is
indemnification. The extremes are the abolition or the retention
of the collateral source rule as it now exists for private defendants.

Regardless of the outcome, Helfend has caused the option of
abolition to be within easy grasp of the court.
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Bank of California,NationalAssociation (Cal. App. 1969).
can be justified by the beneficial effect that it would have on the plaintiff's insurance rates,
as well as its effect on the insurance rates of the public in general. It is the insurance rates
of the blameworthy defendant that should be increased, not those of the blameless plaintiff.
A contrary argument can be made based on the idea that insurance companies are in
business to take risks, and that if they are assured of indemnity, they are no longer taking
the risks that the policy holder is paying them to assume. But this argument fails to
consider the ultimate effect on the parties involved. If the plaintiff's insurance carrier is
made to be the primary source of recovery, then the insurance carrier is assuming two
risks: (1) that the insured will cause an accident, resulting in injury to himself and others,
and (2) that some third party will cause an accident, resulting in injury to the insured.
Insurance rates tend to increase proportionally to the amount an individual has caused to
be paid out in the past, regardless of whether it was his fault. Thus, a person could be
involved in several accidents in which he was not at fault, and find his insurance rates
increasing. If the insurance company is allowed the right of indemnification, then the risks
it is assuming are: (1) that the insured will cause an accident, resulting in injury to himself
and others, and (2) that some uninsured and insolvent third party will cause an accident,
resulting in injury to the insured. In cases where the defendant is insured or sufficiently
solvent, the plaintiff's insurance company can collect any expense it has incurred from the
defendant's insurance carrier or the defendant himself. The net result is that the plaintiff's
insurance rates remain unchanged, since his insurance company has not incurred an
expense as a result of his injuries, and, assuming the defendant had insurance, his rates
may well increase, since his insurance company had to pay for the harm that he caused
to the plaintiff. This seems to be the proper result.
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Appellant Wright maintained a joint checking account with
one Feinberg. The account was maintained with the respondent
Bank of California so as to further a joint venture agreement
between Wright and Feinberg. Feinberg fraudulently induced
Wright to co-sign a check for $24,500 payable to March
Construction Company, Inc., as partial payment of a contract
associated with the joint venture. Feinberg knew that the payee
would not accept partial payment on the above contract since he
had been so informed by Kruley, the Secretary-Treasurer of
March Construction. Feinberg took the check and offered it to
Kruley who refused to accept it.' Feinberg's partner, Campanile,
then went to the respondent bank where Campanile, falsely
representing himself as the payee's agent, presented the
unendorsed check for payment. A forged application for a
cashier's check payable to March Construction Co. was presented
at the same time with the request to receive payment in that form.
Without requesting any identification of the purported agent of
the payee, and without checking with the drawer as to the validity
of the check, the bank made payment as requested. The joint
account of Wright and Feinberg was then charged $24,500. After
receipt of the cashier's check, Campanile again offered it to
Kruley who again refused to accept it. However, on the pretext
of redepositing the check into the Wright-Feinberg joint account,
a blank endorsement was obtained from Kruley. The cashier's
check was then presented to the Hayward National Bank which
issued its own cashier's check payable to Feinberg only.2 Feinberg
then negotiated that check and diverted the funds to his own use.
The complaint stated four causes of action against the Bank of
California based on conversion, negligence, common count for
money had and received, and declaratory relief. The superior
court granted, without leave to amend, respondent bank's general
demurrer to all four causes of action.
On appeal to the California Court of Appeals, First District,
held, reversed and remanded as to the second cause of action.
Payment by drawee bank of an unendorsed personal check, by the
issuance of a cashier's check payable to the same corporate payee,
I. The reason Feinberg presented the check to Kruley is unclear. However, both
appellant and respondent agreed that Feinberg had always intended to make the
presentation. Opening Brief for Appellant at 3; Respondent's Brief at 3.
2. Hayward National Bank was a party at the original hearing but is not involved in
the present appellate action.
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and delivered to an imposter without any attempt at
identification, may support a claim of negligence by the drawer
to recover the value charged against his account. Wright v. Bank
of California, National Association, 276 Adv. Cal. App. 573, 81
Cal. Rptr. 11 (1969), petition for rehearing denied October 23,
1969.
It is submitted that the correct result was reached but for the
wrong reasons. The court first erred in testing the applicability of
the California Commercial Code solely in reference to section
3405. Secondly, the court failed to apply the provisions of section
41031 as the standard of care with respect to the negligence action.
And thirdly, the court erred in failing to recognize the controlling
applicability of section 44016 which imposed a contractual duty
upon the bank.
3. CAL. COMIN. CODE (West 1964). All section references are to the CAL. COMM.
CODE (%Vest 1964).
4. CAL. COMMN.CODE § 3405 (West 1964) states:
Imposters; Signature in Name of Payee. (1) An indorsement by any
person in the name of a named payee is effective if
(a) An imposter by use of the mails or otherwise has induced the maker
or drawer to issue the instrument to him or his confederate in the name of
the payee; or
(b) A person signing as or on behalf of a maker or drawer intends the
payee to have no interest in the instrument; or
(c) An agent or employee of the maker or drawer has supplied him with
the name of the payee intending the latter to have no such interest.
(2) Nothing in this section shall affect the criminal or civil liability of the
person so indorsing. (Stats. 1963, c.819, § 3405.)
5. CAL. COM. CODE § 4103 (Vest 1964) provides:
Variation by Agreement; Measure of Damages; Certain Action
Constituting Ordinary Care. (i) The effect of the provisions of this division
may be varied by agreement except that no agreement can disclaim a bank's
responsibility for its own lack of good faith or failure to exercise ordinary care
or can limit the measure of damages for such lack or failure; but the parties
may by agreement determine the standards by which such responsibility is to
be measured if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable.
(2) . ...
(3) . . . action or nonaction consistent with clearinghouse rules and the
like or with a general banking usage not disapproved by this division, prima
facie constitutes the exercise of ordinary care.
(4) The specification or approval of certain procedures by this division
does not constitute disapproval of other procedures which may be reasonable
under the circumstances.
(5) . . ..
6. CAL. COM. CODE § 4401 (West 1964) states:
When Bank May Charge Customer's Account. (1) As against its
customer, a bank may charge against his account any item which is otherwise
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Respondent drawee bank had maintained that payment of the

check to Campanile was proper, arguing that the check was
payable to a fictitious payee.7 With the adoption of the Uniform
Commercial Code in California' the fictitious payee doctrine is
governed by section 3405. The court correctly noted' that section
3405 is ineffective without an endorsement.'" Since payment of a
negotiable instrument does not require an endorsement," it
properly payable from that account even though the charge creates an
overdraft and in such event recover or obtain refund of the amount of the
overdraft.
(2) A bank which in good faith makes payment to a holder may charge
the indicated account of its customer according to
(a) The original tenor of his altered item; or
(b) The tenor of his completed item, even though the bank knows the item
has been completed unless the bank has notice that the completion was
improper. (Stats. 1963, c.819, § 4401.)
7. Respondent drawee bank maintained that March was a fictitious payee arguing
that Feinberg did not intend March to have any interest In the check. In this respect, the
court first examined the question of whose intent controlled since Wright "did not share
the intention that March Construction Company be merely a 'ficititous payee'." 276 Adv.
Cal. App. at 577, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 14. The court reaffirmed the rule regarding the divergent
intent of joint makers, as stated in Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank,
ICal. App. 2d 694, 37 P.2d 483 (1934), where the court stated:
[T]hat a maker or drawer of a check is bound in every instance where
multiple signatures are required, by the intention of a single person with
reference to such check when it is necessary for such a single person to do
something in the making of the check essential to its validity which is done
within the scope of the authority of such single person and when such single
person is the person, who within the scope of this authority, actively creates
the check or puts it into circulation.
Id. at 707, 37 P.2d at 488. Thus, the intention of only one of the co-makers to make the
check payable to a fictitious payee is controlling with regard to the application of the
fictitious payee doctrine.
8. The Uniform Commercial Code was adopted, as amended, by California and
became effective on January 1, 1965.
9. 276 Adv. Cal. App. at 578, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 14.
10. CAL. COMM. CODE § 3405 (West 1964), Comment 1, amplifies the reasoning
behind the endorsement requirement. It states, in part:
[T]he instrument is not made payable to bearer and indorsements are still
necessary to negotiation. The section however recognizes as effective
indorsement of the types of paper covered no matter by whom made. This
solution is throught preferable to making such instruments bearer paper; on
the face of things they are payable to order and a subsequent taker should
require what purports to be a regular chain of indorsements. . . .To
recapitulate: the instrument does not become bearer paper, a purportedly
regular chain in indorsements is required, but any person-first thief, second
imposter or third murderer-can effectively indorse in the name of the payee.
Additionally, it is apparent that the application is not sufficient to meet the requirements
of an endorsement, as specified in CAL. COMM. CODE § 3203 (fVest 1964), because the
signature was not on the check itself or on a paper attached thereto.
11. CAL. COMM. CODE § 3505 (West 1964) allows the drawee to "require
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appears that section 3405 is applicable only to negotiations. Thus,
the California Commercial Code is silent with respect to payment
of a negotiable instrument and the possible application of the
fictitious payee doctrine.
Although the appellate court correctly concluded that the
answer to the question of respondent's liability could not be found
in section 3405, its involvement with the section initially was
erroneous. It was clearly incorrect to accept the bank's contention
that March Construction Company was a fictitious payee since
Feinberg had always intended that March was -to have an
opportunity to endorse the check. As pointed out in Pacific
Indemnity Company -v. Security First National Bank,12 it is not
whether the named payee is to have an interest in the proceeds but
whether he is "intended to receive the check itself and to place an
endorsement thereon."' 3
Finding section 3405 inapplicable, the court improperly
concluded "that the Commercial Code provisions do not either
establish or negate respondent bank's liability."'1 4 The court then
looked to the alleged circumstances to determine if liability could
be founded on negligence alone. The court applied general tort
principles to the case and stated the issue:
[C]ould the facts pleaded possibly support a determination that
loss to appellant was proximately caused by lack of due care
on the part of respondent bank in dealing with appellant's
5
account and funds?'
In this context a crucial factor to be remembered is that the
cashier's check was made payable to the same payee as the
personal check. It can hardly be said that the respondent or its
agents should have been clearly able to foresee the results of their
action. However, as the court said:
But it is not impossible that Campanile's possession of a
cashier's check induced Kruley to put on the check the writing,
identification and evidence of the presentor's authority and a signed receipt for partial or
full payment." 276 Adv. Cal. App. at 579, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 15. However, it must be

realized that this places no duty on the drawee to require same and these rights are
available solely to avoid the danger that the instrument might be found to have been
dishonored. Id.
12. 248 Cal. App. 2d 75, 56 Cal. Rptr. 142 (1967).
13. Id. at 88, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 151 (emphasis added).
14. 276 Adv. Cal. App. at 579, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
15. Id.
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construed by the Hayward bank as an endorsement, which
enabled Feinberg to procure its negotiation."
Additionally, the appellant's contention that the issuance of
the cashier's check "changed the nature of plaintiff's order"' 7
seems to be well founded. It seems apparent that the check could
not have been negotiated outright, without proper identification of
the presentor and substantiation of the check by the drawers.
Obtaining the cashier's check was critical to the fraudulent
scheme of Feinberg and Campanile. Any attempt to receive
payment, in cash, upon presentation of the personal check would
have initiated immediate inquiries concerning the presentor's
identity and authority to receive payment.
However, the court's reversal, based on common tort
principles, ignores the applicable standard of care explicitly stated
in section 4103. Specifically, the bank owes a duty of ordinary
care as measured by general banking usage.' 8 Conformity to
general banking practices is prima facie evidence of ordinary care
absent any agreements to the contrary. 9
It appears that the Bank of California did deviate from
common banking practices by making payment by cashier's check
to a corporate payee,2 1 in failing to require identification of the
presentor,21 and in failing to demand proof of the agency
2
relationship between the bank and the purported agent.
Furthermore, when the bank sought to escape liability on the basis
that it did not "cash" the March check but only made payment
as directed by the drawer, the court was presented with ample
basis for holding that the bank was liable to the drawer for breach
16. Id. at 580, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
17. As the appellant pointed out:
Defendant Bank's negligent breaches of these duties was further
compounded and enlarged by the fact that in making payment on plaintiff's
check by issuing its cashier's check, defendant Bank changed the nature of

plaintiff's order. In so substituting its own guaranty for plaintiff's defendant
Bank made an irrevocable payment of plaintiff's funds, and thereby precluded
plaintiff from issuing a stop-order, which is a statutory right, binding upon

defendant Bank, should his check fall into the hands of a thief.
Opening Brief for Appellant at 14.
18. CAL. COMI. CODE § 4103(1) (West 1964).
19. Id. § 4103(3).

20. Interview with W.F. VanHorn, Manager, Point Loma Branch of Bank of
America, in San Diego, California, March 1I,1970.
21. Id.
22. See United States Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cheney, 235 Cal. App. 2d 357, 361, 45
Cal. Rptr. 525, 527 (1965).
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of contract as well as for negligence. The bank had maintained
that the check "was not 'cashed' in the sense that money was paid
to the purported agent of the payee who presented the check, but
rather was paid by means of a cashier's check payable to the same
payee." 23 Even if the bank did not "cash" the check the fact
remains that payment was made by a cashier's check delivered to
an imposter. California Commercial Code section 4401 clearly
states that a drawee bank may charge to the customer's account
only those items properly payable from that account. The bank's
failure to meet this contractual obligation is obvious when it is
considered that the bank was ordered to make payment to March
Construction Company, not to an imposter claiming to be the
payee's agent. As was stated in PacificIndemnity:
IT]he entire problem arises because of the heavy burden placed
upon depository banks by their contractural agreement not to
pay out their depositor's funds except in strict accordance with
his instructions. Where a depositor issues a check instructing
the drawee bank to make a payment from his funds on deposit
to a specified person, his account may not be chargedfor this
amount unless this person actually endorses and negotiates this
check.2
The bank was under a clear duty to make payment only as
ordered by the drawer, and its responsibility to fulfill this
25
contractual obligation is rigid.
The appellate court dealt with this case solely on the basis of
whether the facts alleged could constitute negligence. In this
regard the court failed to apply the proper standard of care as
expressed in section 4103. However, the correct result was
probably reached because the bank's conduct was apparently
contrary to standard banking practices.
But more importantly, the court never came to the realization
that the respondent bank violated its contractual duty when it
failed to pay funds according to the strict order of Wright. In so
failing this duty, the Bank of California is clearly liable under
section 4401. It would have been more appropriate if the court's
decision had been based on the clear violation of this contractual
duty rather than the alleged negligent conduct.
EDWARD D. LAPLOUNT
23. Respondent's Brief at 16.
24. 248 Cal. App. 2d at 87, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 150 (emphasis added).
25. Basch v. Bank of America, 22 Cal. 2d 316, 321, 139 P.2d 1, 5 (1943).

